What is up with analects 17.8?

I’m trying to figure out what is going on with Analects 17.8. I have a bunch of very specific questions, some of them just translation issues, but really I’d just like to ask the broad question, “What is up with analects 17.8?”

This is how the passage is translated by Chan Wing-tsit, as it appears as an epigram to chapter 5 of the ethics text I use.

One who loves humanity but not learning will be obscured by ignorance. One who loves wisdom but not learning will be obscured by lack of principle. One who loves faithfulness but not learning will be obscured by heartlessness. One who loves uprightness but not learning will be obscured by violence. One of who loves strength of character but not learning will be obscured by recklessness.

The passage offers a striking parallel to Aristotle. In this the version of the passage, Confucius names five virtues and pairs them with five vices that arise from an excess of the virtue. Unlike Aristotle, he does not name a second vice associated with a deficiency—perhaps fact that the complete absence of a virtue is a vice was simply too obvious to be named. Another way he differs from Aristotle is that he has very specific theory about what is needed to keep from falling into the vice of excess: the moderating factor is always learning (xué).

For some reason, however, this version of the passage is missing one virtue-vice pair. Every other translation out there inserts “One who loves boldness but not learning will be obscured by unruliness,” between Chan’s fourth and fifth sentence. In fact, the full version of the passage makes it clear that there should be six virtues and six vices. This is the translation from Sligerland:

The master said “Zilu! Have you heard about the six [virtuous] words and their six corresponding vices?”

Zilu replied “I have not.”

“Sit! I will tell you about them

“Loving goodness without balancing it with a love of learning will result in the vice of foolishness. Loving wisdom without balancing it with a love of learning will result in the vice of deviance. Loving trustworthiness without balancing it with a love of learning will result in the vice of harmful rigidity. Loving uprightness without balancing it with a love of learning will result in the vice of intolerance. Loving courage without balancing it with a love of learning will result in the vice of unruliness. Loving resoluteness without balancing it with a love of learning will result in the vice of willfulness.

My textbook uses this passage as the epigram to the final chapter on moral knowledge, and I have my students analyze the passage as a part of introducing the major themes of the chapter. I’m interested to what extent the themes of that chapter actually resonate with the concerns of Master Kong. To help with that project I’ve created charts of the words different translators use to translate the virtue names Confucius uses. I’ve reprinted it below.

Sentence 1

	He who loves	Rén (仁)	but not learning (Xué, 學) will be obscured by	yú (愚)
Leys		Humanity		Silliness
Slingerland		Goodness		Foolishness
Ames		Acting authoritatively		Being easily duped
Chan (in Liszka)		Humanity		Ignorance
Legge		Being benevolent		Foolish simplicity

Sentence 2

	He who loves	zhì (知)1	but not learning will be obscured by	dàng (蕩)2
Leys		Intelligence		Frivolity
Slingerland		Wisdom		Deviance
Ames		Acting wisely		Self-indulgence
Chan (in Liszka)		Wisdom		lack of principle
Legge		Knowing		Dissipation of mind

¹Ames and ctex.org give the character, as 知, but it seems to be more commonly written with the radical 日 at the bottom, 智. See p. 55 for a discussion emphasizing the practical character of zhì. Wisdom seems to be the standard translation here.

² I’m having trouble finding any focal meaning or customary interpretation here. Google translate gives “swing” here.

Sentence 3

	He who loves	Xìn (信)1	but not learning will be obscured by	zéi(賊)2
Leys		Chivalry		Banditry
Slingerland		trustworthiness		Harmful rigidity
Ames		making good one’s word		Harm’s way
Chan (in Liszka)		faithfulness		heartlessness
Legge		being sincere		an injurious disregard of consequences.

¹trustworthiness seems to be the standard translation here. Google gives 信 as the first translation of trustworthiness and trust as the third translation of 信. See Slingerland p. 242.

² “Thief” is the meaning that comes up on Google for 賊. Leys seems to be getting at a common meaning here. Also “chivalry” and “banditry” are a nice pair.

Sentence 4

	He who loves	Zhí (直)1	but not learning will be obscured by
Leys		Frankness		Brutality
Slingerland		Uprightness		Intolerance
Ames		Candor		Rudeness
Chan (in Liszka)		Uprightness		Violence
Legge		straightforwardness		Rudeness

¹ Seems to mean moral rectitude in general, with a specific connotation of candor and forthright speech. See Slingerland p. 242. Another oddity: the character is missing a stroke if you change the font to SimSum: 直.

Sentence 5

	He who loves	Yǒng (勇)1	but not learning will be obscured by	Luàn (亂)
Leys		valor		Violence
Slingerland		courage		unruliness
Ames		boldness		unruliness
Chan (in Liszka)	seems to be missing?
Legge		Boldness		Insubordination

¹ The first hit on Google translate for “courage” is 勇. The first two hits for 勇 are “brave” and “courage.”

Sentence 6

	He who loves	Gāng (剛)	but not learning will be obscured by	Kuáng ( 狂)
Leys		Force		Anarchy
Slingerland		resoluteness		willfulness
Ames		firmness		rashness
Chan (in Liszka)		strength of character		recklessness
Legge		Firmness		Extravagant conduct

As it turns out, one major issue in comparing Confucius and the ethics text I use is whether zhì (知) can be productively compared to the Greek phronesis. The textbook is James Liska’s Moral Competence, which presents a philosophical model of the morally competent individual. Chapter 4 discusses the role of wisdom, specifically conceived of as practical wisdom or phronesis, in moral competence. Chapter 5, entitled “Moral Knowledge”, essentially argues that in addition to practical wisdom, moral competence requires some kind of theoretical knowledge. The passage from Confucius is there in part because it asserts that wisdom (zhì) must be moderated by something else, learning (xué). Thus Liszka’s chapter 4 seems like it might be about zhì and Chapter 5 might bear some resemblance to xué.

More broadly, however, I’m interested in how the ideas in Analects 17.8 parallel and diverge from Western virtue theory, both ancient and modern. (This is the concern that makes me think someone on the internet might want to read these thoughts.) One important question for both my narrow and broad concerns is to what extent zhì can be identified with phronesis. This question is extremely fraught, not only because it involves comparing the semantic field of two terms in very different classical languages, but also because each term is going to have a broad, popular meaning and narrow meanings in the context of the theories of different philosophers.

So, the questions:

·         To what extent can zhì be identified with phronesis?

·         Why is Chan missing sentence 5?

·         What are the real semantic fields for these six virtues and six vices?